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Abstract 
 
A concept is presented for a dual-purpose ion-accelerator, capable of serving as radiation 
source in a versatile, nuclear-reaction-based inspection system for massive-cargo. The system 
will automatically and reliably detect small, operationally-relevant quantities of concealed 
explosives and Special Nuclear Materials (SNM). It will be cost-effective, employing largely-
common hardware, but different reactions and data acquisition modes. Typical throughput is 
expected to be 10-20 aviation containers/hr, at the beam intensities specified below. 
 
With such an inspection system, explosives are detected via γ-Resonance Absorption (GRA) 
in 14N using 9.17 MeV γ-rays produced in 13C(p,γ), and SNM via Dual-Discrete-Energy γ-
Radiography (DEGR) with 15.11 & 4.43 MeV 12C γ-rays from 11B(d,n). Simultaneously with 
the scan, 1-17 MeV neutrons from the latter reaction will yield complementary information, 
both on explosives and on SNM, via Fast-Neutron Resonance Radiography (FNRR). Few-
view radiography will be implemented throughout, since spatial reconstruction of threat-
object densities reduces false-alarm rates drastically. 
 
Nevertheless, if a cargo item does alarm the system on SNM, confirmation of its presence and 
composition will be effected via a secondary-screening technique, namely, induced-fission 
decay-signatures, employing the 11B(d,n) neutrons. This should only be required in solitary 
cases and will thus not impede cargo flow to any appreciable extent. For explosives, the 
GRA/FNRR combination comprehensively covers the entire spectrum of substances in the 
arena and no secondary-screening technique should be required. 
 
The essence of the accelerator concept is a fixed-energy machine, alternately delivering mass-
2 beams of H2+ (3 mA, cw) and deuterons (0.2 mA, pulsed) for GRA and DEGR/FNRR, 
respectively. It will operate at precisely double the GRA resonance energy of Ep=1.746 MeV 
(namely, 3.492 MeV) and require beam-energy resolution no better than ~15 keV (FWTM). 
 
This specification was confirmed in a recent measurement, first reported here, of the GRA 
emission-linewidth obtained with H2+ ions, when driving the resonance into the depth of a 
moderately-thick 13C target. For most acceleration techniques, such beam-energy resolution 
requirements are not unduly stringent, which works in favour of the high-current requirement. 
On deuteron beams there are no energy resolution constraints, as the 11B(d,n) reaction is non-
resonant. 
* 
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1. Introduction 
 
The threat to civil aviation, international trade and homeland security posed by illicitly-
transported explosives and fissile materials is of ever-increasing concern. Moreover, 
contemporary terror organizations have become highly skilled in devising bombs that are 
smaller, more potent than hitherto and, no less significantly, progressively harder to detect.  
 
In response, the U.S. Government passed a Bill in 2007 [1], which mandates that, within five 
years, 100% of all U.S.-bound maritime cargo, as well as all aviation cargo loaded onto 
passenger aircraft, be scanned for the above threat materials in foreign ports prior to shipment. 
Indeed, this implies that a very large number of inspection systems with capabilities beyond 
the present state-of-the-art will be needed, at a global hardware outlay estimated [ibid] to 
exceed 5000M$ (more than 1000 systems, at ~5M$ each). Clearly, a large fraction of the cost 
to acquire and operate these systems will fall on countries exporting to the U.S. Moreover, if 
the U.S. becomes less vulnerable, groups intent on harm will seek “softer” targets elsewhere. 
 
Hence, inspection systems capable of rapid, reliable and automatic detection of operationally-
relevant amounts of explosives and SNM concealed in massive cargo items are called for. A 
combined cargo screener concept that responds to this need is presented here. It is based on 
proven technologies and satisfies the criteria of:  1) cost-effectiveness;  2) high sensitivity and 
specificity to the full range of threat materials in the contemporary arena;  3) low false-alarm 
rate;  4) effective further screening of items that are not cleared on the first pass (system is 
truly “multi-level” [2]);  5) low vulnerability to countermeasures aimed at defeating detection. 
 
Within the R&D community, the realization is gradually taking hold that nuclear-reaction-
based γ-ray and fast-neutron probes at judicially-chosen energies [3-17] are probably unique 
in providing the requisite sensitivities and specificities to both SNM and all types of 
explosives employed nowadays. In this context, a principal problem still to be overcome 
pertains to the dedicated, versatile MeV-range ion-accelerator that, together with a target, will 
constitute the radiation source. Indeed, such machines, hitherto developed almost exclusively 
for basic research facilities, have not yet attained adequate user-friendliness, reliability, 
robustness and cost-effectiveness for field applications under harsh environmental conditions. 
 
Moreover, in contrast to X-ray-based systems, accumulating the required counting statistics 
within acceptable inspection times is contingent on the capability of the accelerator to deliver 
beams in the mA-intensity range. Even for low-energy ions, this technological problem has 
not yet been satisfactorily solved for field applications. Thus, the challenge at present is to 
conceive a system that reduces, as much as possible, the demands on such an accelerator, 
which will represent a large fraction of the cost of an operational system anyway. 
 
 
2.  The Concept 
 
2.1  Dedicated Accelerator 
 
The essence of the concept is a fixed-energy accelerator for mass-2 ions, alternately 
delivering beams of 3 mA (cw) H2+ to a 13C target and 0.2 mA (pulsed) deuterons to a 11B 
target, for GRA and DEGR/FNRR, respectively. It will operate at precisely double the GRA 
resonance energy of Ep=1.746 MeV (namely, 3.492 MeV). Minimal energy variability (±20 
keV) will be required to optimize GRA resonance yields and compensate target-wear effects. 
For DEGR/FNRR, this is of no consequence, since the 11B(d,n) reaction is non-resonant. 
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The viability of this dual-purpose concept is non-trivial, since an appreciable contribution of 
proton-proton repulsion in H2+ ions to emission-line broadening of resonant 9.17 MeV γ-rays 
would prove seriously detrimental to GRA-system performance (see sections 4 & 5 below).  
This contribution, recently measured at the PTB Van-de-Graaff and first reported here, was 
found to be small compared to that observed when the level is populated by protons [18-20]. 
 
 
2.2  Combined Screening System 
 
In the inspection process, bulk and sheet explosives are detected via γ-Resonance Absorption 
(GRA) in 14N [20] with 9.17 MeV γ-rays produced in 13C(p,γ), whereas SNM is detected via 
Dual-Discrete-Energy γ-Radiography (DEGR) with 15.11 & 4.43 MeV 12C γ-rays from 
11B(d,n) [10,11]. Simultaneously with DEGR, 1-17 MeV neutrons from the latter reaction will 
yield complementary information, both on explosives and on SNM, via Fast-Neutron 
Resonance Radiography (FNRR) [3-7]. Few-view radiography [21] will be implemented 
throughout, since spatial reconstruction of threat-object densities reduces false-alarm rates 
drastically. The techniques and their underlying physical principles are outlined in section 3 
below.   
 
For cargo items that alarmed in the primary inspection mode, confirmation of SNM presence 
and its composition will be effected via Induced-Fission Decay-Signatures [13,14]. This will 
only be required in singular cases and will thus not impede cargo flow to any appreciable 
extent. For explosives detection, GRA and FNRR complement each other well and their 
combination comprehensively covers the entire spectrum of substances and cargo types in the 
arena (from palletized aviation cargo up to full-size marine containers). Alarms that are 
nevertheless registered will, in all likelihood, be resolved by taking one or two extra 
radiographic projections or by repeating the scan with higher counting statistics. Thus, no 
independent, secondary inspection technique should be required. A block diagram of the 
accelerator and combined cargo inspection system is shown below in Fig. 1.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1:   Block diagram of accelerator and combined cargo inspection system 
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3. Screening Techniques 
  
3.1 Dual-Discrete-Energy γ-Radiography (DEGR) 
 
To penetrate massive cargo containers and detect the threat objects of interest, recourse must 
be made to characteristic attenuation features that come into play at photon energies in the  
1-30 MeV range. At such energies, pair-production comes into play and the mass attenuation 
coefficient exhibits a rise above ~4 MeV, that is progressively more pronounced as the Z of 
the absorber increases. Thus, high-Z materials can be detected and distinguished, as a 
category, from low-Z and medium-Z substances that constitute the majority of benign 
transported items (Fig. 2). In practice, one (essentially normalizing) measurement needs to be 
performed at the global absorption minimum for all atomic numbers Z (between 1 and 4 MeV) 
and another at the highest energy possible [10,11], nuclear reaction yields permitting.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2:   Mass attenuation coefficient as f (E), for low-, medium- and high-Z materials. 
The relevant 12C γ-ray energies produced in 11B(d,n) are marked with arrows. 
Moreover, SNM can be distinguished from benign, high-Z materials (Hg, Tl, Pb, Bi) [10] if at 
least 2 DEGR views are taken and 3-D densities reconstructed, even crudely (see Fig. 3).  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3:   Macroscopic attenuation coefficient as f (Z) for heavy elements, 
calculated at  Eγlow=4.43 MeV  and  Eγhigh=15.11 MeV. 
0.13
0.18
0.23
0.28
0.33
72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94
Atomic Number     Z
∆µ∆µ ∆µ∆µ
 
  
 
x
 
ρ 
 
ρ 
 
ρ 
 
ρ 
 
in
 
cm
-
1
 
Ta
Hf
W
Re
PtOs
Ir
Au
Hg
Tl Pb
Bi
U
Pu
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n   l e v e l
M
ac
ro
sc
o
pi
c
 
at
te
n
u
at
io
n
c
o
ef
fic
ie
n
t  
∆µ∆µ ∆µ∆µ∆µ∆µ ∆µ∆µ
⋅⋅ ⋅⋅⋅⋅ ⋅⋅
ρρ ρρρρ ρρ
[cm
-
1 ]
∆µ∆µ ∆µ∆µ
 
  
 
x
 
ρ 
 
ρ 
 
ρ 
 
ρ 
 
in
 
cm
-
1
M
ac
ro
sc
o
pi
c
 
at
te
n
u
at
io
n
c
o
ef
fic
ie
n
t  
∆µ∆µ ∆µ∆µ∆µ∆µ ∆µ∆µ
⋅⋅ ⋅⋅⋅⋅ ⋅⋅
ρρ ρρρρ ρρ
[cm
-
1 ]
 5 
Clearly, SNM (full red squares) can be distinguished from Rare-Earths, heavy stable elements 
(grey-centred squares) and, to a lesser extent, from transition metals Ta, Hg (white-centred 
squares). The main difficulty seems to be with noble metals, their neighbours (yellow-centred 
squares) and uranium (any isotopic composition), but these are unlikely to figure as undeclared 
cargo. Indeed, there is a definite interest in their being detected if illicitly-transported, so that 
the presence of such materials will not constitute a false-alarm, in the operational sense. 
 
To construct a practicable system with good performance characteristics, judicious choices of 
γ-ray energies and populating reactions employing low-energy beams at sub-mA intensities 
are essential. To this end, a comprehensive literature study of reaction-induced, thick-target γ-
yields has been performed [22,23]. Its conclusions on the most promising radiation source for 
the DEGR application are clear-cut [10]. They pertain to the 12C γ-lines, Eγlow=4.43 MeV and  
Eγhigh=15.11 MeV, populated, in decreasing yield order, by the 11B(d,n), 13C(3He,α) and 
10B(3He,p) reactions at energies Ebeam<6 MeV. Moreover, the 11B(d,n) γ-spectra are also by 
far the cleanest, after fast-neutron events have been rejected (by shielding, by time-of-flight – 
TOF, or by pulse-shape-discrimination  –  PSD), so this is obviously the reaction of choice. 
 
For Ed=3.5 MeV on thick 11B targets, γ-yields/deuteron are: ~3 · 10-5 (Eγlow) and ~7 · 10-6 (Eγhigh) 
 
The key issue is whether such a nuclear-reaction-based radiation source competes favourably 
with Bremsstrahlung (B-S) sources. Indeed, a semi-quantitative comparison was made to 5 & 
9 MeV B-S [10]. Its salient features (for 200 µA, 3.5 MeV deuteron beams) are as follows:  
1.   Unfiltered B-S yields are a factor of ~100 higher 
2. B-S spectra must be heavily filtered, to remove low-energy X-rays that reduce contrast 
3. Minimally-filtered B-S yields are only a factor of ~5 higher 
4. 11B(d,n+γ) Contrast-Sensitivity (=∆µ/µ) is a factor of ~ 5 higher 
5. Overall figure-of-merit (FOM) = Contrast-Sensitivity · √Yield 
6. On overall FOM, 11B(d,n+γ) has the edge over 5 & 9 MeV B-S 
A preliminary measurement at PTB, using organic liquid scintillators in event-counting 
mode, has shown that, for calibrated graphite (C), iron (Fe) and lead (Pb) absorbers, the 
theoretical contrast sensitivities are experimentally well reproduced, if sufficiently narrow 
integration limits are set on the respective Compton edges in the γ-ray pulse-height spectrum. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4:   Schematic showing how few-view DEGR (and FNRR) Radiography  
can be performed in one pass, with multiple detector arrays. 
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Simulations  show[10] that a few-view DEGR system (Fig. 4) permits reliable detection of 
small, operationally-relevant SNM quantities even in massive cargo items that exhibit high 
image clutter. For deuteron beams of 200 µA, cargo throughout is estimated at ~20 aviation 
containers/hr. Radiation doses to inspected items are around 1-10 µGy. If the fast neutrons are 
largely shielded out, doses will decrease by approximately an order of magnitude.    
 
 
3.2 Fast-Neutron Resonance Radiography (FNRR) 
Fast-Neutron Resonance Radiography (FNRR) [5,7] is an imaging method that exploits the 
characteristic cross-section structure (resonances) of different isotopes in the energy-range 
En=1-10 MeV. The pulsed FNRR method, originally named PFNTS, was first proposed and 
studied by the Oregon University group [3] and later by Tensor-Technology, Inc. [4,24]. The 
method holds promise for identifying and detecting a broad range of explosives due to its 
ability to determine simultaneously the identity and density distribution of the principal 
elements present in explosives, such as C, O and N. 
 
In PFNTS the inspected object is 
irradiated with pulsed neutrons of a 
broad spectral distribution in the 
above energy range. If the inspected 
object contains elements that exhibit 
sharp cross-section resonances, the 
neutron transmission spectrum will 
be modified such that it will exhibit 
dips and peaks at specific energies 
corresponding to these resonances. 
The spectrum thus carries 
information on the elemental 
composition of the object. Fig. 5 
shows a calculated transmission 
through 10 cm thick objects 
comprising TATP (an improvised 
explosive), water and polyethylene, 
all of which have similar densities. 
 
Indeed, these items would look the same to an X-ray probe, which measures density only, 
whereas FNRR determines the characteristic stoichiometric ratio of elements in the substance. 
Thus, the neutron transmission spectrum can be used to distinguish TATP and other 
explosives from benign materials of similar physical density. A pre-requisite for FNRR is the 
precise knowledge of the neutron energy. In PFNTS this is achieved by Time-of-Flight (TOF) 
spectroscopy, requiring pulsed beams and imaging systems with TOF measurement capability. 
 
Unlike conventional X-ray radiography systems, FNRR does not rely on the skills of a human 
operator to identify the threat object. Instead, it relies on automatic identification of the 
concealed contraband, via few-view spatial reconstruction of its elemental composition. 
FNRR can detect reliably standard and improvised explosives in solid or liquid form. 
 
The early PFNTS detectors developed by Oregon University and Tensor Inc. had pixel sizes 
of several centimeters. This posed an intrinsic limitation on the position resolution, which did 
not permit reliable detection of thin sheet explosives. Thus, since 2004, PTB, Soreq NRC and 
Fig. 5: Calculated transmission through 10 cm thick 
TATP, water and polyethylene 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
Tr
an
sm
is
si
on
Energy (MeV)
 TATP
 WATER
 POLY
 7 
the Weizmann Institute of Science have been developing a sub-mm spatial resolution FNRR 
system based on time-resolved, integrative, optical neutron detectors (TRION) [7, 25-30].  
 
Fig. 6 shows the latest TRION version, which was operated recently in a demonstration 
experiment. It is capable of acquiring simultaneously up to 4 neutron transmission images at 
different, predefined energy windows. A detailed description of its operating principle and 
performance can be found in a recent publication [31]. Fig. 7 illustrates the typical spatial 
resolution (~0.5mm) obtainable with this detector. The image shows a fast neutron radiograph 
of a gun, its magazine, a vial of UO2 powder and a bar of tungsten (W). Image quality is suitable 
for visual inspection, in addition to the automatic detection based on elemental information.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As mentioned above, an FNRR transmission 
spectrum carries information about the 
elemental composition of the object. Fig. 8a 
shows a picture of 6 milk bottles and 4 small 
vials. The content of the upper-middle bottle 
was replaced by a simulant of TATP, an 
improvised explosive frequently used by 
terrorists. The vials contain various mixtures 
of TATP-simulant and water. Fig. 8b shows 
a conventional γ-ray and neutron radiograph 
obtained using the TRION detector. As can 
be observed, the radiograph does not reveal 
any difference between milk and TATP. 
 
However, taking into account the information provided by FNRR, one can determine the 
composition of the elements reconstruct their areal densities. Fig. 8c shows the reconstructed 
FNRR image. Here, only the bottle and vials containing TATP are visible. On the basis of 
this information, the system can alarm automatically and point to the suspect region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gun 
UO2 Powder 
W bar 
Loaded Magazine 
Fig. 7:  TRION fast neutron radiograph 
 TATP simulant 
Fig. 8:    a) Photograph of milk and TATP bottles   b) combined γ-neutron radiographic 
image;   c) reconstructed FNRR image. 
 
Fig. 6:   Engineering drawing of TRION with 4 independently-gateable cameras for 
simultaneous imaging at 4 different neutron energies 
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Compared to early PFNTS detectors, TRION detectors combine excellent spatial resolution 
with adequate timing (energy) resolution. Time-resolved optical readout permits construction 
of large-area detectors with relatively high (15-20%) detection efficiency, as well as good 
discrimination between γ-rays and neutrons by TOF spectrometry.  
 
Whereas the 2nd generation TRION detector described above can capture up to 4 images at 
different energies, an ongoing development will permit capturing simultaneously up to 8 
images at different pre-selected energies for each neutron burst. This will be accomplished by 
viewing the image formed on the optical amplifier’s phosphor by a special intensified CCD 
camera consisting of an  image splitter, and a special segmented, 8-fold independently-
gateable image intensifier. 
 
In the FNRR system described above we propose to utilize the fast neutrons produced in the 
B(d,n) reaction. At a deuteron energy of 3.5 MeV and beam current of 200 µA the yield of the 
fast neutrons is about 1011 n/s [10]. We estimate that with several (3-5) 20 cm wide detector 
arrays, container throughput will be ~10 containers/hr. 
 
 
3.3  Gamma-Resonance Absorption (GRA) 
Gamma Resonant Absorption (GRA) is essentially a nitrogen-specific radiographic imaging 
method, combining highly-penetrating radiation with sensitivity and specificity to nitrogenous 
explosives. It detects the latter and distinguishes them from benign objects on the basis of 
nitrogen density, which can be determined with adequate precision from a small number of 
views [21]. GRA is thus uniquely well-suited to inspecting large, massive objects such as 
aviation/marine containers, heavy vehicles and rolling stock, the resonant probe being a high 
energy γ-ray of 9.172 MeV.  Among these application scenarios, detecting small threat 
amounts that are relevant to aviation security may be the one in which the overall 
characteristics of GRA are best brought into play. 
 
GRA was proposed by Soreq NRC to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in 
1985 [32] and successfully taken under its sponsorship through several experimental 
feasibility rounds, including a proof-of-principle laboratory test (1989) [33], a blind test on 
aviation baggage aggregates (1993) [34] and a preliminary run on an aviation container 
(1998) [35]. 
 
These tests were all conducted at existing accelerator facilities, since resonant γ-rays are only 
produced with adequate yield and spectral quality by 1.746 MeV protons incident on a highly-
enriched 13C target. Since the beam quality varied considerably (being particularly poor in the 
1993 blind test), the single factor that contributed most significantly to success was the use of 
resonant-response detectors (nitrogen-rich, organic liquid scintillators), specially developed at 
Soreq for this purpose [36] (see below). 
 
The 9.172 MeV level in 14N was first identified in 1951 [37, 38]. It has spin parity Ipi=2+ and 
is the lowest T=1 state in this nucleus. The total level width was first measured in 1959 [18], 
and the present adopted value is:  
    Γtot  = 122±8 eV   ↔   lifetime  τ = (5.5±0.4) ⋅ 10-18 s    [39] 
 
The partial γ-decay width is: Γγ   = 6.3±0.4 eV   of which ~86% goes to the g.s.   [40] 
 
The remaining width:  Γp~116 eV represents proton emission (all other channels closed) 
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Among unbound levels in light nuclei, this level exhibits a very low particle decay width, as 
evident from the high branching ratio Γγ/Γtot = 0.052 (typical values are 10-4-10-8). However, it 
is this hindered particle decay that produces high GRA nitrogen contrast sensitivity, since the 
resonant absorption cross-section is also proportional to  Γγ/Γtot  [41] (Fig. 9). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9:   Mass attenuation coefficient in nitrogen (left), with horizontal scale expanded 
 to show 9.172 MeV resonance (right). 
 
For GRA, the optimal 9.172 MeV γ-ray source is proton capture on 13C at the 1.746 MeV 
resonance. For kinematic reasons, resonant flux is confined to a narrow cone around polar 
angle  θR = 80.7o  (Fig. 10).  
 
Independently-operating GRA stations 
can thus be built around its periphery. 
However, this source is less than ideal, 
for the following reasons: 
a) γ-yield is only ~6⋅10-9/incident-proton 
[18-20] 
b) the emission line is broadened from   
122 eV (nucl. linewidth) to ~520 eV  
[19,20] 
                Fig. 10:  Physics-dictated GRA configuration  
 
One consequence of (b) is that the angular width of the flux cone is broadened to  ∆θR ~ 0.7o 
(FWHM), which practically limits the achievable GRA spatial resolution. 
 
A more fundamental problem associated with the emission-line broadening is that only a 
small intensity fraction within the cone (of order 122/520 ~0.23) is on-resonance radiation. 
Consequently, a conventional-response detector such as NaI, BGO or Ge, measures nitrogen 
sensitivity that is substantially reduced; in fact, by the inverse of this fraction (a factor of ~4). 
 
In contrast to other groups active in the field, Soreq has circumvented this problem by 
developing resonant-response detectors, in the form of nitrogen-loaded liquid scintillators. 
With these, resonant flux is sampled, on an event-by-event basis, by counting photo-protons 
internally-produced via the resonant absorption reaction 14N(γ,p), the inverse reaction to 13C 
p-capture. This is the same process as occurs in the inspected object, but there, the photo-
θR=
∆θR
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protons do not emerge – their range in matter is only 10-50 µm. However, the detector always 
sees the transmission flux attenuation due to nitrogen in the object with undiminished contrast 
sensitivity, independent of the resonant flux fraction in the γ-ray beam.  
A rigorous theoretical analysis based on empirical values has shown that such resonant-
response detectors, when loaded with ~20% nitrogen (wt per wt), clearly prevail over their 
non-resonant counterparts [36]. In fact, the scintillators have been doped with up to ~30% 
nitrogen. 
So far, deployment of a GRA-system has been held up by lack of a compact, robust few-mA 
ion accelerator. For H2+ beams of 3 mA, a GRA screener is anticipated to detect operationally-
relevant amounts of bulk/sheet nitrogenous explosives at throughputs of ~20 containers/hr, 
with <~2% false-alarms. Due to the inordinately high nitrogen contrast-sensitivity associated 
with the nuclear resonance, only 100-200 counts per pixel are required in the nitrogen 
images.  Thus, radiation doses to inspected items and environment are more than an order-of-
magnitude lower than for any other radiation-based explosives detection system. Moreover, 
no remanent activity is induced.  
 
4.  Missing GRA Information 
In the brief review of GRA (Section 3.2) it was mentioned that the aperture of the resonant 
flux cone around polar angle  θR=80.7o  is broadened to  ∆θR ~ 0.7o  −  this is presumably due 
to electron shell excitation processes concomitant with p-capture by the 13C nucleus, as has 
frequently been observed in such low-energy reactions [42]. 
 
Prior to the present work, it was not known whether “Coulomb explosion” effects [43] on the 
H2+ ion, as it traverses the 13C target, would further broaden  ∆θR . Indeed, it has been known 
for many years that such effects appreciably broaden p-capture excitation curves [44]. 
 
Clearly, in the case that  ∆θR (H2+) ≳ 1.5o , as there were grounds to believe [43], GRA spatial 
resolution would be seriously impaired and a principal advantage of the method lost. It was 
thus of cardinal importance for the viability of the dual-purpose accelerator and inspection 
system concept to obtain this missing information (as illustrated on Fig.11)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 11:   Schematic of the missing GRA information for H2+ beams 
3.492 MeV H2+
H2+ flux cone = ??
13C target
1.746 MeV proton beam
proton flux cone ~ 0.7o (FWHM)
θR = 80.7o
Resonant flux cone
∆θR
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5.   GRA Emission-Linewidth Measurements 
The experiments were performed at the PTB 3.5 MV single-stage Van-de-Graaff accelerator.  
With the nitrogen-loaded liquid scintillator (see below), measurements with H2+ are extremely 
sensitive to even 10-4-level deuteron impurities in the beam. In fact, several maintenance 
rounds (primarily on the gas-manifold that feeds the ion source) and beam tests were required 
before the experiment could be performed. This issue must also be borne in mind in designing 
the dedicated mass-2 accelerator, which will need to alternate within tens of seconds between 
the ionic species and deliver H2+ beams appropriately low in deuteron contamination. 
In resonant absorption studies, geometrical factors should not contribute excessively. This 
applies to beam optics parameters (divergence, spot-size), and to detector solid angle. In the 
experiments reported here, beam and detector contributions to the observed 9.17 MeV resonant 
flux conewidth were  ≤ 0.25o  and  0.54o, respectively. Since the primary interest was whether 
or not the H2+ beam would further broaden the conewidth (consistently observed with protons 
in very tightly-collimated experiments to be  ∆θR ~ 0.7o [18-20]), geometrical-broadening 
effects, which add to the intrinsic conewith in quadrature, were indeed sufficiently small.       
In practice, the beam was focussed on the 60 µg/cm2 thick, self-supporting, highly enriched 
13C target using only the first quadrupole lens on the beamline (located ~6 m upstream), 
through a pair of adjustable X,Y slits located about halfway from lens to target. Several cm in 
front of the target, a rectangular collimater limited the beam to apertures of 5 mm and 8 mm in 
the horizontal (essentially, polar) and vertical (essentially, azimuthal) directions, respectively.  
The target was centred on the goniometer axis, on which a resonant-response scintillator [36] 
(Sect. 3.3) was mounted at a target/detector-face distance of 200 cm. The cocktail contained 
~14% nitrogen (wt/wt). Active detector volume was 20 cm long (in the efficiency direction) 
and 2 cm x 2 cm in cross-section (in the polar and  azimuthal directions). It was coupled to a 
fast 2” Hamamatsu phototube. Photo-protons from the resonant absorption process 14N(γ,p)13C 
were distinguished from non-resonant Compton electron events via pulse shape discrimination.   
In the first series of measurements, the 9.17 MeV excitation curves were mapped out with 
both proton and H2+ beams. This was performed using an NaI scintillator, by choosing several 
fixed Van-de-Graaff energies and varying target voltage in small steps over a 16.8 kV range 
in between them. The procedure is inherently more precise and can be performed in much 
finer energy increments than the conventional method using the 90o analysing-magnet field 
calibration. From these curves a relative energy scale was established, the absolute calibration 
being obtained by associating the known resonance energy with the halfway point of the yield 
rise at low bombarding energies. From the data on Fig. 12 (Note: energy scale increases from 
right to left), the working points for the GRA emission linewidth runs were chosen. Fig. 13 
shows the angular distribution of photo-protons (normalized to NaI counts) from Run #3.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Fig. 12:  9.172 MeV excitation curves (p & H2+)       Fig. 13: photo-proton distribution (#3) 
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It can be seen in Fig. 12 that the H2+ excitation curve is significantly broader than its proton 
counterpart, in line with previous observations [44]. The background in Fig. 13 is entirely due 
to impurities of deuterons in the H2+ beam, since resonantly-produced photo-protons are 
indistinguishable from neutron-induced knock-on protons at the same energy (1.51 MeV) in 
the PSD spectrum. Indeed, in Run #1, taken with protons, the background was non-existent. 
 
In the second series of measurements, 
photo-proton angular distributions were 
taken for proton and H2+ beams at the 
bombarding energies indicated in Fig. 
12. Each distribution was then fitted to 
a Gaussian with constant background. 
Fig. 14 shows the fitted FWHM-widths 
obtained. Evidently, within statistics, 
no systematic broadening with H2+ 
beams is observed, even when the 
resonance is driven ~8 keV/nucleon 
into the depth of the target (Run #4). 
      Fig. 14:  Fitted distribution widths (FWHM)   
 
It is surmised that the absence of an appreciable emission-line broadening effect with H2+ ions 
is related to the well-known “wake” effect [43], whereby the trailing particle progressively 
aligns itself behind the leading one, as they traverse the target layers (prior to one of them 
being captured by a 13C nucleus). Thus, the Coulomb repulsion between the two projectiles 
has an appreciable longitudinal component, that manifests itself primarily as a broadening of 
the excitation yield curve, as has been frequently observed for capture resonances populated 
with H2+ ions [44]. In contrast, this Coulomb repulsion does not have a large transverse 
component, and thus does not give rise to appreciable 9.172 MeV emission-line-broadening. 
 
 
7. Summary 
 
The results of the present work have favourable consequences for accelerator beam-energy 
resolution. In fact, even an energy-spread of up to ~15 keV (FWTM) for the H2+ beam would 
be acceptable. Thus, RF-based accelerators (linacs, RFQ’s and internal-target cyclotrons), that 
are more amenable to high-current applications than their electrostatic counterparts, but deliver 
beams with somewhat poorer energy-resolution, can now be considered as realistic options. 
Moreover, RF-technologies are generally more easily ruggedized and miniaturized, a crucial 
advantage for systems required to operate reliably and for extended periods in the field. 
 
The combined cargo inspection system envisaged will automatically and reliably detect small, 
operationally-relevant amounts of concealed explosives and SNM. It will be cost-effective, 
employing largely-common hardware, but different reactions and data acquisition modes. The 
system is also inherently multi-level [2] in the sense that, if an alarm is raised, the cargo item 
in question is subjected to further screening within the system itself, until it can be definitely 
cleared or declared suspect. Throughput is projected to be 10-20 aviation containers/hr. 
 
At the heart of the concept is a dual-purpose accelerator for mass-2 ions, alternately delivering 
several mA (cw) of H2+ and sub-mA (pulsed) deuterons. As shown by the 9.172 MeV 
emission line data of the present work, beam quality requirements are only moderately 
stringent, which opens up the field to accelerator technologies that are compact and robust 
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enough to function for extensive periods under harsh environmental conditions. Thus, the 
present concept outlines a realistic accelerator and associated security-screening system that 
respond to contemporary requirements in the cargo-inspection scenario. 
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